공공기관의 경영성과보상유인과 세금유인이 적자회피적 이익조정에 미치는 영향

Public institutions, as like profit-corporations, have incentives to manage their earnings for maximizing compensation which is resulted from management performance evaluation. Generally, CEO of public institution can be compensated according to her/his performance evaluation. And also employees of the public institution should receive their compensation based on the compensation of their CEO. Thus, CEO and all employees have incentives to manage their earnings because total compensation of the organization is, directly, affected by the result of performance evaluation.
And also public institution is taxed as like civil corporations except essential business (which is a business delegated from government). Therefore, public institution has an incentive to minimize their tax burden by managing decreasing-earnings.
This paper investigates whether there is compensation hypothesis and tax-minimization hypothesis of public institutions and the organizations as like general company execute efficient tax planning that they consider tax and nontax costs, simultaneously.
Results of this study are as follows. First, size of the compensation amount has a positive relationship with possibility of earnings management in order to avoid net loss. It says that public institutions can report near-zero income by managing near- zero loss in order to be highly evaluated in performance evaluation process. Thus, this results support compensation hypothesis. Second, there is a negative relationship between level of tax burden and possibility of earnings management in order to avoid net loss. It shows that the possibility for avoiding to report net loss is low because tax burden of public institutions is high by increasing reported income(changing net loss into net income). Finally, interaction variable(compensation and tax-burden variable) has statistically significant coefficient with the possibility of earnings management in order to avoid net loss. This phenomenon says that public institutions do not consider tax and non-tax perspectives concurrently. Therefore, public institution does not execute an efficient tax planning unlike efficient tax planning of general corporate by Scholes et al.(2002).
This paper make contributions that public institutions as like general corporate can be applied by compensation hypothesis and tax-minimization hypothesis but cannot an efficient tax planning. Therefore, results of this study can use for policy makers to refine performance evaluation system and taxation.