소련과 냉전: Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009)의 비판적 검토

This paper aims to do a critical review on A Failed Empire, one of the recent works of Vladislav M. Zubok, which has been much admired by the specialist and generalists alike as a challenging account of the Soviet side of the Cold War. The book has many strengths as an overview of Soviet foreign policy. In particular, it stands out clearly in using widely various archives, memoirs, interviews and available published primary sources, although Zubok has attempted to write a comprehensive history that spans the entire period of the Cold War. Moreover, the author made many efforts to explain the history of the Soviet Cold War through an impressive theoretical framework, which is called `the revolutionary-imperial paradigm.` According to him, the postwar Soviet leadership through the era of Brezhnev failed to achieve peaceful settlements with America, another superpower, by firmly having kept this paradigm. However, Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, rejected it flatly, presenting `New Thinking` as an alternative diplomatic principle in international relations, and as a result, the animosity and confrontation between two superpowers ended without much bloodshed. On the other hand, the book reveals several weaknesses. Zubok often misinterprets materials in supporting his arguments and tends to ignore important theses by other scholars, not analysing closely. Furthermore, he overemphasizes the role of ideas, in particular, of Soviet leaders when they behaved in the international arena. For example, Zubok gives too much value to Brezhnev`s belief in peace, when he tries to examine his detente. Likewise, Zubok argues that `New Thinking` of Gorbachev played a decisive role in ending the Cold War. Such an analysis by the author resulted frequently in downplaying the structural limitations, such as political, military and economic difficulties on the domestic and international levels, which, sometimes, the Soviet leaders as an individual politician hardly could get over. Moreover, Zubok does not discuss in earnest social and cultural dimensions of the Soviet side of the Cold War. Particularly, he almost failed to examine the Cold War experiences of the Soviet grassroots. For better work, he should have considered more carefully how the international developments affected the Soviet general public and, in turn, how they responded to the Cold War policies of the Soviet governments. (Seoul National University of Science & Technology/namsubkim@ seoultech.ac.kr)