Abstract
By treating the building coverage ratio as an attribute of housing services representing the outdoor quality of residences, we develop an economic theory explaining how equilibrium building coverage ratios might emerge in the free market where housing consumers interact with housing producers. In equilibrium, poor households prefer the cheaper housing with higher building coverage ratios (that is, lower outdoor amenities) as opposed to rich households. This means that the compliance cost of the regulation mostly falls on the poor households. In addition, the regulation penalizes the land-intensive housing and favor the capital-intensive housing.
| Translated title of the contribution | Building Coverage Ratios as a Housing Attribute and the Effects of the Regulation |
|---|---|
| Original language | Korean |
| Pages (from-to) | 49-63 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | 국토계획 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 2016 |