지방정부 정책선택의 정치·경제적 이익에 관한 연구

This study analyzes how local governments react to incentive policy of the central government considering the political and economic benefits. It examines 143 cases of local governments that have received general subsides incentive for 10 years from 2006 to 2015. The analytical results show that local governments have been used blame-avoidance strategy to reduce political losses in various political and economical situation in spite of economical benefits. The incentive policy of standard amount of financial demand is adopted when economic conditions are good; that is high demands on the budget of residents, or there is no local election. A lot of local governments are reluctant to respond for the incentive policy of standard amount of financial revenue. It is evidence to need institution design to understand that local government is an autonomous decision maker to consider political and economical conditions in their region rather than respond to economic incentives of the central government in moral hazard terms.