A Study on Rekeying and Sponged-based Scheme against Side Channel Attacks

Translated title of the contribution: 부채널 공격 대응을 위한 Rekeying 기법에 관한 연구

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Abstract

Simple Power Analysis(SPA) and Differential Power Analysis(DPA) attacks are Side Channel Attacks(SCA) which were introduced in 1999 by Kocher et al [2]. SPA corresponds to attacks in which an adversary directly recovers key material from the inspection of a single measurement trace (i.e. power consumption or electromagnetic radiation). DPA is a more sophisticated attacks in which the leakage corresponding to different measurement traces (i.e. different plaintexts encrypted under the same key) is combined. Defenses against SPA and DPA are difficult, since they essentially only reduce the signal the adversary is reading, PA and DPA. This paper presents a study on rekeying and sponged-based approach against SCA with current secure schemes. We also propose a fixed ISAP scheme with more secure encryption and authentication based on secure re-keying and sponge functions.
Translated title of the contribution부채널 공격 대응을 위한 Rekeying 기법에 관한 연구
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)579-586
Number of pages8
Journal디지털콘텐츠학회논문지
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2018

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