TY - JOUR
T1 - Between prescription and practices in Seoul Metropolitan city
T2 - Institutional constraints and relational contracting
AU - Kim, Jaehoon
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Public choice theories suggest contracting out as a cure-all for various weaknesses of government bureaucracy and its absence of competition. The transaction cost economics theory challenges these theories, arguing that competitive contracting is appropriate only for hard services like human waste collection while relational contracting is for soft services such as welfare facility management. After examining contracting practices of 25 district governments of Seoul Metropolitan Government, however, this study found that informal institutional constraints led district governments to adopt relational contracting for human waste collection and to adopt competitive contracting for welfare facility management.
AB - Public choice theories suggest contracting out as a cure-all for various weaknesses of government bureaucracy and its absence of competition. The transaction cost economics theory challenges these theories, arguing that competitive contracting is appropriate only for hard services like human waste collection while relational contracting is for soft services such as welfare facility management. After examining contracting practices of 25 district governments of Seoul Metropolitan Government, however, this study found that informal institutional constraints led district governments to adopt relational contracting for human waste collection and to adopt competitive contracting for welfare facility management.
KW - Institutional constraints
KW - Relational contracting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33745911937&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/01900690600770595
DO - 10.1080/01900690600770595
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33745911937
SN - 0190-0692
VL - 29
SP - 873
EP - 893
JO - International Journal of Public Administration
JF - International Journal of Public Administration
IS - 10-11
ER -
