TY - JOUR
T1 - Cannibalization and competition effects on a manufacturer's retail channel strategies
T2 - Implications on an omni-channel business model
AU - Kim, Jae Cheol
AU - Chun, Se Hak
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2018/5
Y1 - 2018/5
N2 - This paper analyzes two effects caused by “channel conflict” which occurs when firms newly add a direct online channel via the Internet or a mobile device. The first is an “intra-cannibalization effect” between the firms’ existing retail channel and the new online channel, and the second is the “inter-competition effect” between manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain. In particular, this paper investigates a manufacturer's retailing channel strategy considering the relative market power between a manufacturer and a retailer in the supply chain, which has been rarely considered in previous studies. This paper shows the manufacturer's channel strategies: (i) if customers are very heterogeneous with regard to their receptiveness to online shopping, the manufacturer may use a multi-channel strategy. (ii) if the customer sector becomes homogeneous, the manufacturer will become more willing to adopt an omni-channel strategy. (iii) if customers are neither similar nor very different, the manufacturer uses a brick-and-mortar strategy. This paper also shows results on the issue of channel conflict in terms of market power: (i) the retailer may voluntarily limit its market power and thus, self-created competition in the retail market alleviates the problem of double-markup to some extent. (ii) the manufacturer can use an online channel when inter-competition effect becomes severe.
AB - This paper analyzes two effects caused by “channel conflict” which occurs when firms newly add a direct online channel via the Internet or a mobile device. The first is an “intra-cannibalization effect” between the firms’ existing retail channel and the new online channel, and the second is the “inter-competition effect” between manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain. In particular, this paper investigates a manufacturer's retailing channel strategy considering the relative market power between a manufacturer and a retailer in the supply chain, which has been rarely considered in previous studies. This paper shows the manufacturer's channel strategies: (i) if customers are very heterogeneous with regard to their receptiveness to online shopping, the manufacturer may use a multi-channel strategy. (ii) if the customer sector becomes homogeneous, the manufacturer will become more willing to adopt an omni-channel strategy. (iii) if customers are neither similar nor very different, the manufacturer uses a brick-and-mortar strategy. This paper also shows results on the issue of channel conflict in terms of market power: (i) the retailer may voluntarily limit its market power and thus, self-created competition in the retail market alleviates the problem of double-markup to some extent. (ii) the manufacturer can use an online channel when inter-competition effect becomes severe.
KW - Channel conflict
KW - Channel management strategies
KW - Inter-competition
KW - Intra-cannibalization
KW - Omni-channel model
KW - Pricing strategies
KW - Supply chain
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044510773&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.dss.2018.01.007
DO - 10.1016/j.dss.2018.01.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044510773
SN - 0167-9236
VL - 109
SP - 5
EP - 14
JO - Decision Support Systems
JF - Decision Support Systems
ER -