Co-CEOs and asymmetric cost behavior

This study investigates the effect of co-CEO structure on asymmetric cost behavior. A firm's cost behavior reflects managers' decision making about resources, which can be influenced by various factors. One of them relates to a manager's decision to inefficiently reallocate their company's resources when sales decline in pursuit of their incentives for empire-building and disincentives for downsizing. These inefficient resource allocations may result in asymmetric cost behavior, and ultimately be harmful to a firm's sustainability. We consider the co-CEO structure as an alternative corporate governance mechanism that prevents managers from making inappropriate decisions. By doing so, we investigate whether the degree of cost stickiness differs between co-CEO and single-CEO structures, and whether the former complements external governance mechanisms, particularly foreign ownership, in mitigating cost stickiness. We analyze data from Korean listed companies for 2000-2013, and find that the cost stickiness is lower in the co-CEO structure than in the single-CEO structure. Thus, the co-CEO structure works as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to control the agency problem by inducing mutual monitoring among co-CEOs. Furthermore, the reduction in cost stickiness is greater for firms with higher foreign ownership, indicating that the co-CEO structure complements external governance mechanisms.