Distance to Governance Regulatory on Financial Performance: Evidence from Managerial Disclosure Activities at Vietnam

This study examines how geographic distance to Vietnam’s centralized securities regulator—the State Securities Commission (SSC)—influences firm-level stock price crash risk. In emerging markets characterized by weak governance, corruption, and political connections, distance can erode monitoring effectiveness and heighten managerial incentives to conceal bad news. Using data on Vietnamese listed firms from 2010 to 2024, we find a robust positive association between a firm’s distance to the SSC headquarters in Hanoi and its future crash risk. The effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and in provinces with high corruption, but disappears in SOEs and in more transparent regions, where state-related networks provide insulation from weak formal institutions. Exploiting the 2019 Securities Law as a quasi-natural experiment, we show that the distance effect was more pronounced before the reform, suggesting that improved formal regulation can partially offset geographically induced monitoring frictions. Additional tests reveal that the effect is amplified among firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and those with higher financial leverage. Our findings provide novel evidence on the spatial dimension of regulatory enforcement in emerging markets. We highlight geographic distance as a significant but previously overlooked source of crash risk, with implications for regulators in designing risk-based supervision and for investors in pricing location-driven risks.